1 3 declined. Moreover, since 1980 the EU has grown faster than the United States in only nine out of 32 years. Thus Ferguson's verdict: the EU is a failure. Judt (2005) also weighs in on peace and prosperity. In terms of prosperity, he simply claims that the "economic benefits of the single market have been real" (p. 732). With respect to peace, he concedes that the lesson that war is too high a price to pay for political or territorial advantage had been brought home to the victors after World War 1; it took World War 2 to also bring it home to the losers.
11 Nevertheless, the elites and institutions of the EU are now so intertwined and interdependent that armed conflict is all but inconceivable. Moreover, it would be difficult to deny that many of the Eastern European countries, which joined the EU in 2004 (cf. Supplementary Appendix Table A .1), saw the EU "as an escape route out of their past and an insurance policy for the future" (p. 734). 12 Thus Judt's verdict: the EU is a good thing.
Whatever one's thoughts about the peace issue, it is not well-suited for an empirical evaluation. There is no credible way of separating the influence of the EU from that of NATO (or from widespread conflict weariness, for that matter). One could perhaps focus on the main proximate link in the peace argument, which holds that trade reduces conflict. 13 However, while multilateral trade reduces the risk of a global war, it does not necessarily reduce the risk of bilateral conflicts. Because openness to multilateral trade decreases bilateral dependence vis-à-vis any given country, it may thus (depending on the international governance system) decrease the cost of a bilateral conflict (Martin et al. 2008) . At the same time, if economic integration is a powerful force for lasting peace it is somewhat puzzling that there are some many within-country conflicts.
14 Add to this that the secular forces associated with modernity have steadily worked to diminish violence on a global scale (Pinker 2011) . Consequently, the focus of the present paper will be on prosperity as the key outcome that the EU will be measured up against. 15 Even if one considers the peace issue to be central, an assessment of EU's growth record should still be of independent interest.
11 A very similar view is found in Mazower (1999) , who argues that the shock of being subjected to a regime of unprecedented violence in the few years between 1938 and 1945 instigated a sea change in Europeans' political and social attitudes; in fact, it made them rediscover the virtues of democracy. Mazower also argues that the post-war focus on full employment and state planning for the social good (as opposed to the inequities of prewar laissez-faire) provided one of the preconditions for post-war political stability.
12 Political stabilization also played a role when the EU was enlarged with Greece and, a few years later, with Portugal and Spain (Staab 2013) . In the motivation for the Nobel Peace Prize, the Nobel Committee also emphasizes the EU's benign role for political stability. The Committee furthermore believes that the question of EU membership bolsters the reconciliation process after the Balkan wars as well as the promotion of democracy in Turkey. See http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2012/eu-facts.html. 13 Judt's (2010) argument does not build on the foundation that war is less likely among countries that trade, an insight frequently associated with Emmanuel Kant's 1795 Essays on Perpetual Peace. However, a leading policy economist such as Larry Summers does not seem to question that trade leads to peace. See "Global trade should be remade from the bottom up, " Financial Times, 11 April 2016. 14 We thank the Editor for pointing this out. 15 This is also the dimension that Ferguson identifies as the most important and the one which Judt (2010) and the European Commission both assert that the EU has delivered. Note, however, that the whole notion of pan-European economic cooperation goes back at least to the interwar years (Mazower 1999) . The 1925 Locarno treaties and the 1927 Genova conference were perceived by some as a move towards "an economic league of Nations [sic] whose long-term goal…is the creation of a United States of Europe" (p. 111).
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There is a small empirical literature which considers the growth effects of EU membership. 16 Landau (1995) , for example, considers a sample of 17 OECD countries during the period . The estimating equation is a growth regression which includes e.g. GDP per capita, government debt to GDP, proxy for human capital, and a terms of trade measure. The independent variable of interest is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the country is a member of the EU, zero else. 17 Landau does not find that the EU dummy is significantly correlated with economic growth, which leads him to conclude that "there has not been a statistically significant difference between the growth of EEC and non-EEC developed market economies" (p. 781). Henrekson et al. (1997) estimate a growth regression with right-hand side variables such as schooling, investment to GDP, and a trade policy proxy. The variable of interest is a dummy which takes the value 1 if the country is a member of either EU or EFTA, zero else. Using a sample of 115 countries over the period [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] , they find that the EU/EFTA is correlated with economic growth at a five percent level of significance in their baseline specification. They conclude that "regional integration in Europe not only affects static efficiency but can also have […] significant growth effects" (p. 1555). Vanhoudt (1999) analyses the time series properties of weighted EU real GDP per capita growth from 1950 to 1990. He concludes that there is no unit root in the weighted EU economic growth (thus no scale effects), and he also shows that EU economic growth fell as the EU expanded from having six to having ten member countries. Such a fall in economic growth was not observed for the US economy over the said period. Vanhoudt also estimates a growth regression specification on a panel of 23 OECD countries over the 1950-90 period. Employing an EU membership dummy, he finds no differences in growth performance between EU and non-EU OECD countries. Vanhoudt thus concludes that there are "no growth effects associated with EU membership" (p. 214). Using synthetic control methods, Campos et al. (2014) construct a counterfactual (or synthetic) EU from a pool of 11 non-EU OECD and 24 middle-income countries.
Comparing EU and synthetic counterfactuals, Campos et al. conclude that there is "strong evidence of positive pay-offs from EU membership" (p. 25).
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The chairman of the Genova conference envisaged this as the "sole economic formula which can fight effectively against the United States of America" (p. 113). Moreover, the idea of European economic integration with the creation of tariff-free zone was proposed by German Reich Minister of Economics (Reichswirtschaftsminister) Walther Funk in the summer of 1940, and idea which Goering seemed to approve (ibid). 16 According to Campos et al. (2014, p. 2), the literature is "disappointingly small". Our brief review of the literature only considers the literature that analyses EU membership. The reason, which will be explained more fully in Section III.A, is that a more proximate measure such as trade integration leads to fundamental problems of causal interpretation. 17 An interaction between the dummy variable and a time trend is also included in the specification. 18 Campos et al. (2014) assert that they present "improved estimates". However, synthetic control methods-as the name suggests-are of course no panacea. There are non-trivial choices and assumptions involved. In any case, robust (causal) findings should be method neutral in the sense that they hold across different (reasonable) identification strategies (Angrist and Pischke 2009; Imbens 2014) . As shown in the present paper, the finding that EU has a large impact on prosperity is not method free in this sense. In fact, we
5
The present paper departs from the existing literature in several ways. First, our analysis is informed by the potential outcomes literature. This requires that we must be able to specify a well-defined counterfactual with respect to our treatment variable. It also means that we do not add a long list of confounders to our empirical specifications. Second, we slice and dice the data in various ways as part of several distinct identification strategies. Third, we use larger datasets (more countries, longer time horizons) than existing studies. Finally, we deal explicitly with problems of statistical inference resulting from spatial and temporal dependencies. The conclusion that emerges upon looking comprehensively and systematically at the data is that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that EU membership has zero impact on economic growth. This may be the result of some combination of noisy data and the fact that causal identification is just too complicated in a non-experimental setting, or, alternatively, it may simply reflect that EU membership has no effect on prosperity. In any case, it suggests that an agnostic stance with respect to EU's growth contribution is justified.
Needless to mention, the EU provides many other direct benefits (or costs, depending on one's perspective) to the citizens of Europe. It may well be true that the scale, the multi-level policy interlocking, and the sheer bureaucratic opacity of some of the EU processes obscure these benefits (Benz and Stutzer 2004) . But it also seems certain that, for example, the right to study, work, travel, and live in any EU country of one's choosing is a benefit that many Europeans value highly. And the EU has also contributed to, among many other things, consumer protection, workplace safety, regional convergence, and constitutional rights protection. By focusing exclusively on economic growth, we only consider the indirect 'growth value' of any of these many likely direct EU benefits. This is an obvious limitation of the present research.
19 But overall, we trust that an agnostic stance with respect to the growth contribution of EU membership is both justified empirically and nontrivial in terms of its political economy implications.
address the Campos et al. study in some detail in the Supplementary Appendix. Specifically, we show that the said study's "large positive effects" are not present when we employ nearest-neighbor matching techniques in the context of the same set of observables that they work with. 19 On a more general level, we are, in effect, adopting an outcome-based ethical framework (consequentialism), see Wight (2015) and Hausman et al. (2017) . Looking at the other benefits-right to work, study, travel, etc.-would not change this. Alternative ethical frameworks, however, could be brought to bear. A duty-and rules-based framework could argue that for historical reasons, European integration is simply a moral obligation. This has most certainly been a driving force for older generations of Europeans. A virtue-based ethical framework in turn could argue that "the EU is a normative power" (see Manners 2008) . A key requirement here would be that the EU lives by "virtuous example", which means that it is coherent and consistent. Coherence entails that the EU does not just promote its own norms, but that the normative principles that constitute it and its external actions are part of a universalized strategy for the common good. Consistency in turn entails absence of hypocrisy in the sense that the EU must follow the norms it promotes (Manners 2008) . It should be clear that the consequentialist framework is the only ethical framework that lends itself to rigorous empirical testing (see, however, Alesina et al. 2005 for an attempted quantitative evaluation of a non-consequentialist framework).
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The paper is structured as follows. Section II offers some data plots, which provide the first indication that EU membership is no universal growth remedy. Section III offers a more systematic empirical analysis. Section IV offers concluding remarks.
II. Some Simple Plots
Turning to the data, consider first the comparative performance of the EU and the United States since 1980, which is the comparison that Niall Ferguson makes. The IMF's World Economic Outlook Database provides real GDP growth rates going back to 1980 for the EU (size weighted) and the US. These are plotted in Figure 1 . The EU only managed to outperform the US economy in terms of real GDP growth in ten out of the 35 years between 1980 and 2015. The (arithmetic) average annual growth rate in real GDP was 0.026 and 0.019 in the United States and the EU, respectively. With these growth rates, the US economy would double its size every 27 years, whereas the corresponding number for the EU is 36 years. This hardly amounts to stellar performance on part of the EU. It is more or less on this basis (and the identification of NATO as the main cause of peace in Europe) that Niall Ferguson reaches his negative verdict on the EU.
[ Figure 2 . Inspection of the figure leads to the impression that these two groups of countries have performed at a comparable level. Indeed, average annual growth was 0.0227 in the EU group versus 0.0235 in the non-EU group.
[ 
III. Empirical Analysis

A. Model Specification and Data
We will use real GDP per capita (or per worker) growth as our main dependent variable, as real GDP per capita growth is a better measure of changes in welfare than are changes in the size of the overall economy (Lequiller and Blades 2014) . The US population, for example, is structurally more dynamic (e.g., it rises faster) than that of Europe, say, which means that US real GDP grows faster, all else equal.
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We will use EU membership as the independent variable of interest. A more proximate measure such as trade integration leads to problems of causal interpretation, as it does not provide a clear and well-defined counterfactual. In the language of the potential outcomes literature, there is non-manipulability of treatment (see Consider then the following very simple regression equation:
(1) ∆ log( ) = + + + .
In equation (1), ∆ log( ) is the annual (continuously compounded) growth rate of real GDP per capita (per worker) of country in year ; is a country fixed effect; is a time fixed effect; and is a binary indicator taking the value 1 if country is an EU member in year , zero otherwise. In equation (1), therefore tells us the average annual growth contribution of EU provided that ( | ) = 0.
We start by estimating equation (1) on a global sample of more than 200 countries. This approach bears a resemblance to the well-known difference-in-differences estimator, where the group of countries that never entered the EU serves as an untreated control group for the countries that did enter. To be sure, it is not obvious that the group of all non-EU countries constitutes an appropriate control group for retrieving an estimate of EU's growth contribution. For instance, poorer countries may reap advantages of backwardness (Abramovitz 1986) and/or conditional convergence may be operative (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004) . Put differently, at any given time countries that join the EU are richer than the 'average' world country, which likely invalidates ( | ) = 0. We deal with this issue in two ways.
First, we estimate equation (1) on the sample of "original" OECD countries (henceforth OECD-21), which joined the OECD in the early 1960s. 24 Among the OECD-21, seven countries never joined the EU; these seven countries will therefore serve as control group in the difference-in-differences type setup that equation (1) amounts to. 25 The said countries are likely to constitute an appropriate control group. A complication that arises in the context of using the OECD-21 sample, however, is that the panel becomes long. This means that asymptotics should rely on fixed N and large T. We therefore use both pooled least squares with long panel- Second, we also estimate a standard growth regression (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004) on the global sample. The growth regression looks as follows:
(2) ∆ log( ) = α + + γ log( −1 ) + + .
The inclusion of the lagged income term, log( −1 ), is meant to control for convergence effects (distance from a country's steady state); indeed, this can be given a structural interpretation (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004) . A more mundane interpretation is that it picks up more general advantages of backwardness (Abramovitz 1986 ).
That is, where estimation of equation (1) on the OECD-21 sample seeks to eliminate confounders via simple stratification logic, the growth regression aims to do so via the inclusion of lagged income per capita. While stratification is likely more convincing as a strategy to rule out confounding, the growth regression has the advantage that it can be estimated on a much larger sample.
Equations (1) and (2) are not nested. Of course, we could ensure nesting by estimating the following equation:
(3) ∆ log( ) = α + + + γ log( −1 ) + + .
Unfortunately, the conditions for consistent estimation of equation (3) are much more demanding than those required for estimation of equations (1) and (2) (3) can be estimated using the somewhat complicated machinery of difference and system GMM estimators. These estimators do not require external instruments, but instead rely on lags of the instrumented variables (so-called internal instruments). Consequently, they allow the unobserved country fixed effects to be correlated with the lagged dependent variable
26
; it is this 26 To see that log ( −1 ) is a lagged dependent variable use that ∆ log( ) = γ log( −1 ) is mathematically equivalent to log( ) = (γ + 1) log( −1 ).
correlation that makes standard estimators inconsistent, provided of course that (3) is the correct specification.
We will estimate equation (3) on a global sample using these dynamic panel methods.
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The appropriate length of the panel is not clear-cut. The Eurozone both exacerbated the pre-2008 boom and the post-2010 crisis. It exacerbated the boom because, as Walters (1990) warned long ago, with the nominal interest being beyond any single country's own control, the real interest rate falls with rising inflation, and vice versa. This rendered the system potentially unstable. It exacerbated the bust due to the incompleteness of the Eurozone edifice (Sinn 2014; De Grauwe 2014) . 28 Thus it may make some sense to consider what happens when we discard the years 2010-2015 from the observation window. On the other hand, it probably makes less sense to discard the global financial crisis years 2008-09, as basically all rich countries were hit hard and because it represented a warranted correction. 29 Consequently, we will consider three periods. The full sample period 1961-2015 (1951-2011) is the result of using all available data in the World Development Indicators [WDI] 2015
(Penn World Tables [PWT] 8.1); that is, this is the maximum length of the panel. 30 The sample period 1961-2009 (1951-2009 ) removes the Eurozone crisis period, whereas the sample period 1961-2007 (1951-2007) removes the global financial crisis.
A few words on the pros and cons of WDI versus PWT: The PWT panel is longer than (more years), but not as wide as (fewer countries), WDI. Moreover, a recent assessment of measures of economic activity, based on nighttime lights data, concludes that the WDI are as good, and often better, measures of unobserved true income as are any recent vintages of the PWT (Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin 2016) . WDI is therefore our preferred data source. However, the advantage offered by PWT for present purposes is that the variable varies for all EU countries. As the WDI sample starts in 1961, the 'original six' do not contribute to the within variation in .
31
27 Both estimators assume no second-order autocorrelation in the differenced errors, so this will be tested. Moreover, there is the problem of 'instrument proliferation', so the number of instruments will be reduced by setting the number of usable lags to two. The two estimators basically differ in that the difference estimator instruments differences with levels, whereas the system estimator instruments levels with differences.
28 According to Brunnermeier et al. (2016) it was difficult to decide prior to the crisis whether growth was sound or driven by cheap credit. They invoke "the naked swimmer" metaphor to describe this: "Only when the tide goes out and the water level recedes does it become apparent whether the swimmer is naked" (p. 118).
29 Of course, the Eurozone crisis also represented a warranted correction, as many Spanish cajas and German sparkassen had lend aggressively to fund property booms in peripheral Eurozone economies. 30 We use GDP per capita in constant local currency from World Development Indicators 2015. The WDI indicator code is NY.GDP.PCAP.KN. From PWT 8.1, we extract real GDP per worker. We construct it as real GDP at chained PPP divided by employment (i.e., rgdpe/emp in PWT notation). PWT Data, which can be downloaded at http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/pwt-8.1, are from Feenstra et al. (2015) . 31 Note, however, that EU-28 becomes EU-27 in PWT, as Croatia first entered the EU in 2013. Table 1 reports estimates of growth of real GDP per capita (columns 1-3) and GDP per worker (columns 4-6) on the binary EU membership variable and country and time fixed effects; i.e., it estimates equation (1).
B. Results
Here we basically measure pre-and post-entry growth for the EU countries up against the growth trajectories of all other countries. Inspection of the Consequently, in Table 2 we focus on the OECD-21 sample where all countries are to some degree (structurally) similar; indeed, a t-test (unequal variances) fails to reject the null that the difference in means in (log) real GDP per capita in 1961 between EU and non-EU OECD-21 countries is zero (p-value 0.22). In this OECD-21 sample we find neither an economically nor a statistically significant difference between economic growth in EU and 32 Mathematically, GDP per capita can be written as / , where is the population. GDP per worker (or labour productivity), on the other hand, is equal to / , where L is the labor force. This means that GDP per capita equals GDP per worker times the fraction of the population in the labor force; i.e., GDP/P = (GDP/L)(L/P). As the L/P ratio varies across countries, GDP per capita and GDP per worker are related but different concepts.
33 Table A .2 of the Supplementary Appendix investigates what happens when we allow for treatment heterogeneity by allowing the five successive waves of EU enlargement to have differential impacts on economic growth. Except for the enlargement in 1973 where Denmark, Sweden and the UK entered, results are negative, as in the restricted model reported in Table 1. 34 Formally, if ( , log( −1 )) > 0 and γ < 0 (where γ is the population coefficient associated with the omitted term log( −1 )) then plim ̂< when estimating equation (1). non-EU OECD member countries, cf. Focusing attention on OECD-21 (as done in Table 2 ) seeks to balance the data using stratification. This amounts to indirect covariance control, which (in many cases) is a credible causal strategy. In Table 3 , we turn to the less credibly strategy of direct covariance control via estimation of the growth regression associated with equation (2) We cannot rigorously decide between equations (1) and (2), as the two equations are non-nested.
Consequently, in Table 4 we turn to dynamic panel estimation of equation (3), which nests equations (1) and (2).
Inspection of Table 4 reveals a negative impact of EU membership when the difference GMM estimator is employed. This is regardless of whether we use real GDP per capita from WDI (cf. panel A, columns 1-3) or real GDP per worker from PWT (cf. panel B, columns 1-3). However, the effect is always statistically insignificant.
When system GMM is employed, we find evidence of a growth premium in the WDI context when the sample ends in 2009 (cf. panel A, column 5). However, as we reject the null of no second order autocorrelation, the conditions for consistent estimation are not met in this case. Moreover, when we use PWT's real GDP per 35 In the Appendix, we exclude the US and Japan from the OECD-21 sample. This makes no difference to our results, as inspection of Appendix Table A.7 reveals. 36 Of course, we cannot rule out that a rising EU has "lifted all boats" in the OECD-21 sample.
13 worker in panel B, there is no effect. Overall, the basic message from the dynamic panel estimations reported in Table 4 is that the EU entry has no measurable impact on economic growth.
[ TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Let's sum up the results so far. First, when we estimate equation (1) on the global sample (using either WDI or PWT) we tend to find a growth drag associated with EU entry, cf. Table 1 . The growth drag is not driven by the Eurozone crisis; it also obtains when the years 2010-15 are removed from the dataset. However, the growth drag is only found in the global sample, where confounders are more likely to taint results; it is never found in the preferred OECD-21 sample, where economic and statistical insignificance obtains in all columns, cf. Table 2 . Second, when we turn to equation (2), WDI and PWT yield opposing results, cf. Table 3 . As noted above, these opposing findings are not driven by sample differences. Finally, when we estimate equation (3) using dynamic panel methods, we also conclude that there is no growth effect of EU membership, cf. Table 4 .
Overall, this suggests the conclusion that the EU has performed at a level comparable to its peers; or, put differently, EU membership does not appear to increase prosperity.
In Section C below, we subject this conclusion to a list of auxiliary robustness checks.
C. Additional Robustness Issues 37
EU Accession Dynamics
Accession to the EU is not automatic. The applicant country must prepare itself before joining the EU, which means complying with accession criteria and implementing the acquis communitaire. 38 The accession criteria, also known as the Copenhagen criteria, are political stability (e.g., institutions guaranteeing democracy, rule of law, human rights), economic criteria (e.g., a functioning market economy), and administrative and institutional criteria (e.g., the capacity to take on the obligations of membership).
Between March 1994 and January 1996, for example, ten Central and Eastern European countries submitted their applications to the EU. Cyprus and Malta had already submitted their applications in 1990. Ten of these twelve countries became EU members in 2004. In the run-up to accession, the countries undertook many reforms and received help from the EU to modernize agriculture, infrastructure, and so on. To the extent that 14 these reforms improved the economy, it may be misleading to use the date of actual accession in an empirical analysis. That is, part of the growth premium of EU membership may be realized prior to actual membership.
Note, however, that if there were a pre-entry growth effect, but no post-entry effect, EU membership would merely offer a level effect (or, equivalently, a temporary growth effect), not a permanent growth effect. To explore potential pre-entry growth effects, we lag the EU membership variable 10, 9…, 1 years (that is, we substitute − ( = 10, 9, … ,1) for in our estimating equations). there is no evidence of a pre-entry growth boost, while the evidence of a growth drag remains.
When we instead drop the years of the eurozone crisis, 2010-15, from the sample the picture is less clear: There is always insignificance in the growth regressions (cf., columns 11-12), but in the OECD-21 sample there is now evidence of a growth boost at lags 8 to 10.
Overall it is therefore safe to conclude that trying to take pre-accession dynamics into account does little to alter the conclusion from Tables 1-4. The conservative conclusion that the EU appears to have no impact on prosperity remains intact.
Formerly Planned Economies
Yet another way to assess the economic growth contribution of EU membership is to look at the sample of the Eastern European countries, which were granted membership in 2004 or later. These countries are Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, cf.
Appendix Table A.1. All these countries were previously planned economies, although they were also, on the whole, geographically closer to Western Europe than other non-EU acceding countries further to the East (Kopstein and Reilly 2003) . It therefore makes sense to compare these new EU member' growth record with that of 18 non-EU countries that were also connected with the Soviet orbit. 39 That is, in this section we ask whether growth picked up in the new Eastern European EU countries after accession vis-à-vis growth in 18 formerly planned non-EU countries.
Before turning to regression based statistical inference, it may be instructive to take a brief look at economic growth before and after the EU accession in the accession countries. Of the 11 accession countries, not even one had higher average annual real GDP per capita growth in the period after the EU accession as 39 The full sample consists of the following 29 countries: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Belarus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. compared to the period before, cf. Figure 5 . This means that a simple difference estimator would find a negative effect; one that is statistically insignificant, as it turns out (not reported).
[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE]
The financial crisis of 2008-09 and the Eurozone crisis certainly confound any attempt at inference, as crises tend to elevate growth prior to their onset and the reverse after. However, once we turn to difference-indifferences type regressions as in equation (1), where the comparison group consists of the formerly planned non-EU accession countries, we control for the potentially confounding impact of crises, as the non-accession countries were also influenced by them. This is of course the advantage of the difference-in-differences setup. If we calculate real GDP per capita growth for the group of 18 formerly planned economies that did not enter the EU before and after 2004 (the year in which eight of the 11 accession economies joined the EU), we get respectively -0.8% and 4.7%. Doing the same calculation for the accession countries, we get respectively 3.32% and 2.99%. Thus, not only was the growth rate in the non-accession countries faster after 2004 compared to before, but these countries (as a group) also grew faster than accession countries after 2004. In fact, save for the year 2014, growth has been higher every year since 2004 in non-accession countries compared to accession countries, cf. Figure 6 .
40 Such simple considerations should instil moderation with respect to what we can expect in terms of an EU-induced growth premium in the formerly planned EU accession economies.
[FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE]
Let us now turn to regression results, which are reported in Appendix Table A.4. As is immediately obvious upon inspection of the table, all EU coefficients are negative. Moreover, they are statistically significant 40 The better pre-2004 growth performance of the (subsequent) EU accession countries (evident especially between 1990 and 1996) may be due to more radical post-communist transition reforms in this fast-reformer subset of former communist states. Alternatively, or additionally, it could be due to economic diffusion and network effects due to these EU-accession countries' closer proximity to the EU-15, as compared to countries in the Western Balkans and the former Soviet Republics (Kopstein and Reilly 2003; Krugman 1995) . By contrast, the worse post-2004 growth performance of EU accession countries may represent greater exposure to the Eurozone crisis in the latter group of countries. Alternatively, it may reflect entirely different models of economic development adopted by the less democratically advanced polities in the Western Balkans and the former USSR (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012) . Recent research by the IMF may also shed light on our findings (Atoyan et al. 2016) . Large and persistent emigration from Eastern Europe has hurt sending countries' economies. Labor outflows-particularly outflows of young, skilled workers-lowered productivity growth, pushed up wages, and slowed growth and income convergence. Simultaneously, remittance inflows may have reduced incentives to work and led to exchange rate appreciations, eroding competitiveness. The departure of young, skilled workers also added to the fiscal pressures of already aging populations in Eastern Europe. In the Supplementary Appendix, we discuss the consequences of migration for our empirical analysis in some detail. when equations (1) and (2) are used (cf. columns 1-2, 4-5), but statistically insignificant in equation (3) (cf. columns 3 and 6). This once again suggests that the EU has not added anything in terms of higher economic growth.
Spatial Error Correlation
So far, we have assumed that growth rates are statistically independent across countries. This is potentially problematic, as pointed out long ago by among others De Long and Summers (1991). The concern is that unobservables may be correlated across countries, for which reason each country does not necessarily provide as informative and independent an observation as any other. 41 Such spatial dependencies distort conventional standard errors, which leads to unreliable statistical inference. It is not possible to obtain precise knowledge about spatial dependencies across countries. However, the fact that we use country fixed effects should reduce the problem somewhat, as the country fixed effects pick up correlation among slow-moving and time-invariant unobservables. Nevertheless, it may be of some interest to address the issue more directly in order to gauge whether statistical inference is based on a (fairly) safe footing.
A widely used approach to address the problem is to assume that the physical distance between countries reflect their proximity in terms of unobservables. Under this assumption, Conley (1999) 41 De long and Summers exemplify the problem using Belgium and Holland, whose respective growth rates are unlikely ever to deviate significantly. Of course, the growth rates within the EU are also highly dependent. 42 The time-series analogue of this approach is roughly that of Newey and West (1987) . 43 We use Stata code developed by Hsiang (2010) and subsequently amended by Thiemo René Fetzer (see http://www.trfetzer.com/conley-spatial-hac-errors-with-fixed-effects/).
Panel Averages
In the cross-country growth literature, it is not uncommon to generate panel averages to prune the data for business cycles. As we always include a time trend or a full set of time dummies, this should not make any difference to the results reported in the paper. For completeness, however, Appendix Table A 
IV. Concluding remarks
This paper has been unable to reject the null hypothesis that 'EU membership has zero impact on economic growth'. Of course, we cannot rule out that our inability to reject the null is a consequence of unsurmountable difficulties with respect to approximating the true counterfactual outcome. This objection applies to all observational studies. Moreover, we cannot rule out that our inability to reject the null hypothesis simply reflects noisy data. Although all OECD countries refer to the same international system of national accounts, in practice the quality of their statistical systems varies somewhat (Lequiller and Blades 2014) . The OECD concludes that different measurement methods imply that a growth discrepancy between the United States and another OECD country of less than 0.3 percentage points should not be considered statistically significant (Lequiller and Blades 2006) . 44 Add to this that Gordon (2016) and Feldstein (2017) argue respectively that GDP fails to account for true growth in prosperity historically and today.
Whichever way one chooses to interpret our results, the inability to reject the null hypothesis is not inconsequential. Indeed, many official reports arrive at the opposite inference: the OECD's Brexit report, for example, claims that the EU has contributed in no small measure to British prosperity; 45 the Danish government recently commissioned a study, which found that EU membership had made Danes much richer; 46 and 44 When we turn to emerging markets, we are on a substantially less solid base. Indeed, for some countries one may reasonably doubt whether GDP data make much sense at all (Jerven 2013) . In Zambia, for example, just one man was responsible for preparing national income accounts in 2010; at the same time, incentives were biased against producing estimates. Moreover, data collection is often politicized with measurement often "taking the backseat" (Jerven 2013 ). For many African countries, base years for GDP series even date back some 20 years. 45 See http://www.oecd.org/eco/the-economic-consequences-of-brexit-a-taxing-decision.htm. 46 See https://erhvervsstyrelsen.dk/det-indre-markeds-oekonomiske-betydning-danmark
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Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, an independent part of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, found that EU membership had made the Dutch much richer. 47 Our findings suggest an agnostic position vis-à-vis the growth effects of EU membership would be more appropriate. Moreover, this is consistent with the latest thinking on growth strategy. The EU can create a level playing field but there is no off-the-shelf blueprint when it comes to growth policies. Policies to address country-specific binding constraints on growth must be tailored to local context, and so it becomes the remit of national policymakers (Rodrik 2010 ).
The pertinence of context has transformed how the economics profession thinks about growth strategy.
Until recently, international institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank would have recommended a noncontextual growth strategy. This presumed that it was possible ex ante to settle on a unique set of appropriate institutional arrangements (best-practices) and that convergence towards these institutional arrangements would lead to higher economic growth. Today, these same international actors recognize the importance of context, as elucidated in the growth diagnostics framework (see IMF 2013). Indeed, the IMF highlights that a number of its recent country reports and papers have applied growth diagnostics to identify country-specific binding constraints on growth. The governing idea behind growth diagnostics is that a few focused policy interventions (i.e., the removal of a small number of binding constraints on growth) are far superior to the traditional approach based on implementing a fairly long list of reforms, which has failed to deliver in terms of economic growth.
48
The aim of growth diagnostics is to identify the constraints with the largest direct effects, in the hope that removal of these will stimulate economic growth (i.e., the direct effects will overshadow any offsetting indirector general equilibrium -effects).
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Consider now joining the EU. As already noted, this means complying with the accession criteria and implementing the EU acquis, which is essentially a non-contextual reform strategy. The growth diagnostics framework suggests that there can be no presumption that this will target the binding constraints on growth, let alone the binding constraints with the largest direct effect. By extension, there can be no presumption that EU membership will have a discernible effect on the economic growth of its member states. The latest thinking on growth strategy thus provides no reason to expect that EU membership will affect economic growth. Put differently, joining the EU does not make for a growth strategy per se. The results reported in this paper are consistent with this line of thinking.
SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX Campos et al. (2014) study
In this supplementary appendix, we address the Campos et al. (2014) To conduct matching on the covariates we must make some subjective decisions. To minimize such decisions, we will mainly rely on the default settings in Stata's teffects nnmatch. This means inter alia using the Mahalanobis distance function and reporting Abadie-Imbens (robust) standard errors. The only non-default choices we make are to use bias-adjustment (which is recommended when covariates are continuous, cf. Guo and Fraser 2010) and to focus on the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET). We focus on ATET 26 because we are interested in whether EU membership benefitted actual EU members as opposed to whether it will benefit countries that will never become EU members. Consequently, the analysis entails minimum discretion on our part. Table S .1 corroborate the findings reported in the main paper.
[SUP. APP. 
Migration
Recent research by the IMF may be of relevance to our findings. Concretely, Atoyan et al. (2016) argue that large and persistent emigration from Eastern Europe has hurt sending countries. Labor outflows-particularly outflows of young, skilled workers-lowered productivity growth, pushed up wages, and slowed growth and income convergence. Simultaneously, remittance inflows may have reduced incentives to work and led to exchange rate appreciations, eroding competitiveness. The departure of young, skilled workers also added to the fiscal pressures of already aging populations in Eastern Europe. At the same time, if citizens with above average income in a poor country migrate to a rich country and work there for a below average income, it might well be that average income declines in both countries. Could such an ecological fallacy work to taint our findings?
To explore this question, we have gathered data on net migration from World Development Indicators, where net migration is the number of immigrants less the number of emigrants (including both citizens and noncitizens). We normalize this number with the size of the population, and we call the resulting variable migration. This variable can be constructed for many countries at five year intervals, as migration is only available every fifth year. We have further reasons to be skeptical that an ecological fallacy taints our results. First, if there is such an effect, it is likely to be quite small. Indeed, in a meta-analytical review of existing econometric studies on net migration, income growth and convergence, Ozgen, Nijkamp, and Poot (2010) find that a one percentage point increase in net migration increases the rate of real income per capita growth by only 0.1 percentage point.
Second, the issue of an ecological fallacy probably only became an issue as of 2004, when the EU was enlarged with countries that had income levels significantly below the pre-2004 EU average. In all tables in the main paper, we report results obtained when the sample ends in 2007, so these results are not affected by an ecological fallacy. Third, poorer member countries are net recipients of EU funds, which works to counter the effects arising from an economic fallacy.
29
APPENDIX TABLES
[ 1961 1961 -2009 1961 -2007 1961 1961 -2009 1961 -2007 1961 1961 -2009 1961 -2007 1961 1961 -2009 1961 -2007 Notes : Dependent variable is annual growth in real GDP per capita. Columns 1-3 corresponds to columns 1-3 of Table 1 ; columns 4-6 corresponds to columns 1-3 of Table 2 ; columns 7-9 corresponds to columns 1-3 of Table 3 ; and columns 10-12 corresponds to columns 1-3 of Table 4 . Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See notes below the said tables for further details.
OECD-21
Growth regression
Full sample
Diff-in-diff
Full sample OECD-21 1991-2015 1991-2015 1991-2015 1991-2009 1991-2009 1991-2009 Notes : Dependent variable is annual growth in real GDP per capita. Columns 1 and 4 estimate equation (1); columns 2 and 5 estimate equation (2) ; and columns 3 and 6 estimate equation (3) . Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Notes : Dependent variable is annual growth in real GDP per capita. Standard errors in columns 1-3 are long panel-corrected errors, which allow heteroskedasticity and correlation over i . *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in columns 4-6 in addition assume AR(1) for each i . The option pairwise selection in Stata's xtpcse routine is invoked in order to use all observations that can be matched by period between panels i and j . All regressions include country fixed effects and a linear time trend. 
NNM OLS
Notes : Dependent variable is average annual growth in real GDP per capita 1973-2011. Columns 1-3 estimates ATET using nearest-neighbour matching, whereas columns 4 and 5 reports OLS results. In the OLS regressions we do not report the control variables, which are S1 and S2, and S2 in respectively columns 4 and 5. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All standard errors are robust.
Average annual growth in real GDP per capita 1973-2011 standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Odd columns include migration, whereas even exclude it. Columns 1&2, 3&4, 5&6, 7&8 respectively are estimated on the same sample, the only difference being that even columns in a given pair of columns exclude the migration variable.
